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McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 24 (July 23, 2009 1 ) 2
CRIMINAL LAW – HABEAS CORPUS – DEATH PENALTY
Summary
Appeal from an order of the district court dismissing appellant’s post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty case.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed district court order dismissing appellant’s post-conviction petition
notwithstanding the fact the district court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Robert Lee McConnell pleaded guilty to first-degree murder with the
use of a deadly weapon, sexual assault, and first degree kidnapping. 3 At sentencing, the
jury found the three aggravators in this case were not outweighed by any mitigating
circumstances and returned a death sentence for first-degree murder.
On direct appeal, despite holding that an aggravator cannot be based on the same
felony as used to establish felony murder, the Court concluded McConnell was not
entitled to relief because he clearly pleaded guilty to willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder rather than felony murder. 4
The district court dismissed a subsequent post-conviction petition for writ of
habeas corpus without conducting an evidentiary hearing on any of McConnell’s several
claims for relief. McConnell appealed the order dismissing his claims without an
evidentiary hearing.
Discussion
A post-conviction habeas petitioner “is entitled to a post-conviction evidentiary
hearing when he asserts claims supported by specific factual allegations not belied by the
record that, if true, would entitle him to relief.” 5 The Court held the district court did not
err by dismissing McConnell’s claims without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

1

This opinion has been corrected pursuant to an order entered by the court on July 24, 2009 (corrected
third full sentence on page 15 of the advance opinion).
2
By Ian Houston
3
McConnell admitted shooting and killing his ex-girlfriend’s fiancé, threatening his ex-girlfriend with a
knife, handcuffing her, sexually assaulting her and kidnapping her, forcing her to drive to California.
4
McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043, 1069, 102 P.3d 606, 624 (2004), rehearing denied, 121 Nev. 25, 107
P.3d 1287 (2005).
5
Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 353, 46 P.3d 1228, 1229 (2002); see Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503,
686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).
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A. Claim that Nevada’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional
Relying on the recent decision in Baze v. Rees, 6 McConnell argued in his petition
that Nevada’s lethal injection protocol does not sufficiently safeguard against a
“substantial risk of serious harm” and as such violates the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The district court concluded that a post-conviction petition
for a writ of habeas corpus “by law . . . is used solely to attack a judgment or sentence”
and is thus an improper forum to challenge Nevada’s protocol. 7
The Court agreed holding that under NRS § 34.720, a post-conviction petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is limited in scope to (1) “[r]equests [for] relief from a judgment
of conviction or sentence in a criminal case” and (2) “[c]hallenges [to] the computation of
time that [the petitioner] has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction.” McConnell’s
challenge deals only with the former. The Court held that McConnell’s challenge of
Nevada’s lethal injection protocol does not call into question the validity of his
conviction. Further, because McConnell seeks to invalidate a particular procedure for
carrying out the sentence, his challenge does not call into question the validity of the
death sentence itself. 8 As such, McConnell’s constitutional challenge is outside the
scope of a post-conviction petition for habeas corpus under NRS Chapter 34 and the
district court did not err in rejecting this claim with conducting an evidentiary hearing.
B. Claims that challenged the validity of the guilty plea
McConnell argued the district court erred in dismissing his claims that his guilty
plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. A guilty plea is presumptively valid and
the defendant bears the burden of establishing the guilty plea was not entered knowingly
and intelligently. 9 The Court will not invalidate a plea where it is evident from the
totality of the circumstances that the defendant plead guilty freely, knowingly and
voluntarily 10 and understood the nature of the offense and the consequences of the plea. 11
The Court held that McConnell did not meet his burden under the totality of the
circumstances and the record demonstrates his guilty plea was entered knowingly and
voluntarily.
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Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
842 (1994)).
7
The district court was incorrect in further denying McConnell’s claim under the law-of-the-case doctrine
because on direct appeal, McConnell did not challenge, and the Court did not address, the constitutionality
of Nevada’s specific protocol.
8
The manner in which death by lethal injection is carried out in Nevada is left to the Director of the
Department of Corrections.
9
Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986); see also Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671,
675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994).
10
State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 1104, 13 P.3d 442, 447 (2000).
11
See Kidder v. State, 113 Nev. 341, 344, 924 P.2d 254, 256 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Freese,
116 Nev. at 1106, n.7, 13 P.3d at 448 n.7.
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C. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, the
defendant must demonstrate (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the
deficiency prejudiced the defense. 12 Failure to prove either prong ends the analysis. 13
1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel
The Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McConnell’s claim that his
standby trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance by permitting him to plead
guilty in light of a pending discovery request, by failing to properly investigate and by
failing to properly prepare. To establish prejudice, McConnell carried the affirmative
burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would not have entered a guilty
plea but would have instead insisted on trial. 14 The Court held that McConnell did not
meet his burden.
First, McConnell did not have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of
standby counsel because he waived his right to counsel and chose to represent himself. 15
Second, pursuant to RPC 1.2, a lawyer in a criminal case shall “abide by the client’s
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered.” McConnell stated
during the pleading canvass that he was pleading guilty against the advice of counsel.
Third, McConnell did not specify in his petition what discovery was outstanding and how
that discovery would have convinced him not to plead guilty. He, therefore, did not meet
his affirmative burden of establishing prejudice by showing that but for his attorney’s
error in allowing him to plead guilty despite a pending discovery request, he would not
have plead guilty but instead would have gone to trial.
2. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the defendant
carries the burden of demonstrating that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that an omitted issue would have had a reasonable
probability of success on appeal. 16 However, appellate counsel is not required to raise
every non-frivolous issue on appeal. 17

12

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 687.
14
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107
(1996).
15
See Harris v. State, 113 Nev. 799, 804, 942 P.2d 151, 155 (1997) (holding that defendant does not have
right to advisory counsel); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (“When an accused
manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits
associated with the right to counsel”).
16
Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1113-14.
17
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
13
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a. Jury Instruction on weighing aggravating and mitigating
factors
McConnell challenged appellate counsel’s failure to argue that the district court
should have instructed the sentencing jury that in order to impose a death sentence, the
aggravating factors must outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Court held that the district court did not err in dismissing this claim because this
argument would not have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. No Nevada
statute or caselaw imposes a requirement that the State prove the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 18
b. Mandatory review of death sentences
McConnell challenged the district court’s dismissal of his claim that appellate
counsel failed to argue that the Supreme Court of Nevada has not articulated any
standards for its mandatory review of death penalty sentences pursuant to NRS §
177.055(2) thus frustrating any direct appeal with respect to the excessiveness of his
sentence. McConnell argued that the Court only considers whether “the crime and
defendant before [the Court] on appeal [are] of the class or kind that warrant[ ] the
imposition of death?” 19
The Court clarified that death sentences of “similarly situated defendants may
serve as a frame of reference” in an excessive sentence determination. 20 Further, the
Court considers “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant and the
crime.” 21 The Court held that McConnell failed to specify how he would have benefited
by more specific standards and that it thoroughly considered on direct appeal whether
McConnell’s character and the crime warranted death. McConnell failed to demonstrate
this claim would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal and the district
court properly dismissed the claim without an evidentiary hearing.
c. Elected Judges
McConnell challenged his appellate counsel’s failure to argue that elected judges
presiding over his trial and appellate review are beholden to the electorate and are
therefore incapable of impartiality.
The Court held that the district court properly dismissed this claim without an
evidentiary hearing because McConnell failed to substantiate his claim with any specific
factual allegations demonstrating actual judicial bias. The Court concluded this argument
would not have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal.

18

NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(a) permits a death sentence “only if . . . any mitigating circumstance or
circumstances which are found do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” NEV. REV. STAT. §
175.554(3) states that “[t]he jury may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating
circumstance and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.”
19
Dennis v. State, 116 Nev. 1075, 1085, 13 P.3d 434, 440 (2000).
20
Id.
21
Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 16, 38 P.3d 163, 173 (2002).
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d. Death-qualified jury
McConnell argued the district court erred in dismissing his claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel based on appellate counsel’s failure to argue that jury
selection was unfairly limited to those jurors who were “death qualified.” However,
death qualification of a jury is not an unconstitutional practice. 22 Further, McConnell’s
jury was chosen only for sentencing. Therefore, in order to ensure their ability to
perform their duty as jurors, each was required to be death certified. As such, the district
court did not err in rejecting McConnell’s claim that appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise this issue.
e. Application of the McConnell rule
McConnell challenged the district court’s dismissal of his claim that appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that two of the aggravating
circumstances were improperly based upon the predicate felony alleged in support of the
felony-murder charge.
The Court held that this claim was belied by the record in that appellate counsel
did raise this issue on direct appeal. Because the issue on direct appeal did not involve
the validity of his guilty plea but rather the theory upon which the first degree murder
conviction was based and McConnell did not cite relevant authority to undermine the
Court’s analysis on direct appeal, the district court did not err in dismissing the claim
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
D. Direct appeal claims
McConnell argued the district court erred in dismissing eight of his claims
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Court held that these issues should have
been raised on direct appeal and thus are procedurally barred under NRS § 34.810 absent
a showing of good cause and prejudice. The district court did not err in dismissing these
claims because McConnell failed to make such a showing.
E. Cumulative error
McConnell argued that under the cumulative-error standard the Court applies on
direct appeal, 23 the effect of the claims raised in this appeal rendered his conviction and
sentence unfair. The Court held that even if the cumulative-error standard used on direct
appeal were the correct standard under the instant circumstances, McConnell failed to

22

See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 416, 420 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173
(1986); Aesoph v. State, 102 Nev. 316, 317-19, 721 P.2d 379, 380-81 (1986); McKenna v. State, 101 Nev.
338, 342-44, 705 P.2d 614, 617-18 (1985).
23
See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 535, 50 P.3d 1100, 1115 (2002) (“The cumulative effect of
errors may violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial even though errors are harmless
individually”).
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assert any meritorious claims. As such there is nothing to cumulate and the district court
did not err in dismissing this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Conclusion
A constitutional challenge of Nevada’s lethal injection protocol in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus under NRS Chapter 34 is not a cognizable
claim because it involves a challenge to the manner in which the death sentence will be
carried out rather than the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.
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